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PROPENSITY TO ENLIST: RECRUITING IMPLICATIONS
People are central to everything else we do in the Army. Institutions don't transform, people do. Platforms and organizations don't defend this nation, people do. And finally, units don't train, they don't stay ready, they don't grow and develop leadership; they don't sacrifice; and they don't take risks on behalf of the nation; people do.
General Eric Shinseki
Nothing is more important than that the guardians' work be performed well. Force, Navy, and Marines dominate the seas, skies, and land; their ships, tanks, and airplanes are the best in the world. U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are the best-trained, bestequipped, and best-led forces in the world.
Despite these advantages, the U.S. Armed Forces face a myriad of challenges. The
United States faces an enemy whose tactics of terror threaten fundamental U.S. civil liberties the armed forces have sworn to defend. The U.S. Armed Forces face the challenge of transforming their capabilities to meet the demands of the future while staying ready to meet the threats of today. U.S. Armed Forces are operating in a resource-constrained environment that forces leaders to make tough choices. Additionally, U.S. active forces are increasingly performing their duties for a public that does not know them or understand what they do. U.S.
elected officials are engaged in a fundamental ends-ways-means debate over National Security Strategy and the military role in that strategy. However, the U.S. society generally agrees on the desired end state: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. Even so there is on-going debate on the ways and means to reach that goal. Certainly, the ends-ways-means discussion on National Security is not new, but the volatile, uncertain, changing, and ambiguous environment of the 21 st Century has new and unique implications for the fielding, training and use of our military. Specifically, this new environment has significant implications to all the services particularly the Army as it strives to recruit a quality force for the 21 st Century. Pressed to prioritize among the many challenges facing U.S. Armed Forces, the challenge of recruiting a quality force invariably floats to the top of the list. U.S. national security depends on an adequately trained, equipped, and manned force. This Strategy Research Project examines the dynamics of propensity of young Americans to serve in the military and seeks to identify ways to increase the propensity of America's youth to serve. It suggests ways to recruit a quality force to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
ALL-VOUNTEER FORCE
In 1973, the United States abandoned the policy of conscription in favor of an all-volunteer force (AVF). The unpopular Vietnam War and a strong public perception of an unfair draft system were prime motivators for this policy shift.
2 Many defining moments of American culture took place during the turbulent sixties and seventies: the civil-rights movement, the free speech movement, the Watergate scandal, and formations of a strong and vocal anti-war community.
The impact on the military, particularly the Army, was great. Eaton reported that the Army had been unable to fill its rather modest enlistment quotas for another year with men of any quality:
A country possessing 12 millions of people ought surely to be able at all times to possess itself of an army of 6,000 men obtained upon principles of fair contract; if this can not be effected then will it be better to rely on some other means of defense, rather than resort to the expedient of obtaining a discontented and besotted soldiery. Project focuses solely on the acquisition function, which has three major components:
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• Manpower management: The process of linking accession, retention, and promotion targets to Army requirements as measured by against the military manning program in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) process.
• Accession and retention management: The process that converts manpower targets to missions and oversees execution.
• Training integration: The establishment of a demand for training programs and a system to control input and tracking of trainees and students. Minimum aptitude standards:
• Youth who score in Category V are ineligible to enlist by statute.
• No service may enlist more than 20 percent Category IV recruits.
Defense Guidance:
• At least 60 percent of accessions in each Service should be Category IIIA or
higher.
• No Service should enlist more than 4 percent Category IV, and all should be high school diploma graduates. As noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), our service effectiveness depends on more than just end strength; the education and aptitudes of service personnel has a direct relationship with mission performance:
The Department of Defense must recruit, train, and retain people with the broad skills and good judgment needed to address the dynamic challenges of the 21 st century. Having the right kinds of imaginative, highly motivated military and civilian personnel, at all levels, is the essential prerequisite for achieving success. Advanced technology and new operational concepts cannot be fully exploited unless the Department has highly qualified and motivated personnel and officers who not only can operate these highly technical systems, but also can lead effectively in the highly complex military environment of the future.
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TABLE 2. ACTIVE ENLISTED ACCESSIONS BY AFQT CATEGORY (PERCENTAGE)
THE CHALLENGE
After a decade of struggling to meet recruiting goals, all services with the exception of the Marine Corps failed to meet recruiting goals by over 7,000 accessions in 1998 and 1999. The core of the joint force of 2020 will continue to be an All Volunteer Force composed of individuals of exceptional dedication and ability. Their quality will matter as never before as our Service members confront a diversity of missions and technological demands that call for adaptability, innovation, precise judgment, forward thinking, and multicultural understanding. The nation must continue to depend on talented individuals of outstanding character, committed to an ethic of selfless service.
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In hindsight, the recruiting shortfalls of the late nineties were in part a consequence of the 
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The first question RAND sought to answer was whether the supply of potential recruits was adequate. RAND examined the supply of potential recruits and concluded that the supply of potential enlistees should be adequate to meet recruiting demands. The Department of Defense and military social researchers use three main databases for the study of youth behavior.
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• Monitoring the Future is a nationwide study of youth attitudes and behaviors, conducted annually by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. Survey samples range from approximately 14,000 to 19,000.
• Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) is a nationwide survey of youth attitudes about various aspects of military service, their propensity to enlist, and the role of those who influence their attitudes and behavior. The Department of Defense has conducted the survey since 1975, the age range of the participants is 16-24 and the sample size is approximately 10,000.
• The Alfred P. Sloan Study is a nationwide longitudinal study of students conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.
PROPENSITY
Propensity is an overall measure that summarizes the influence of a variety of factors on youth's interest in joining the military at a given point in time. 31 The primary source of information used by the Department of Defense to assess youth interest in joining the military is the Youth Attitude Tracking Study, which measures the respondents positive or negative propensity to serve in the military. 32 The respondents are asked to respond to questions concerning their intent to serve on active duty in the Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps.
The respondent is asked to reply to these questions in terms of "definitely," "probably," "probably not," or "definitely not." 33 Those who say "definitely" or "probably" are considered to have positive propensity for military service, the other, negative propensity. 34 The propensity to enlist among high school males has been declining since the mid-1980s. In this key group for recruiting, the proportion saying "definitely" enlist has declined from 12 to 8 percent.
Additionally, youth surveys from 1980 to 1999 show the number who will "definitely not" serve in the military have increased from 40 to 63 percent.
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Propensity to enlist has proven over the years to be a very consistent predictor of recruitment. A study done by Wilson and Lehnus concluded "positively propensed high school seniors are applying to enter the military about 5 times as frequently as those who indicated negative propensity." 36 The strong relationship between propensity and enlistment means that a decline in positive propensity from one year to the next should cause concern, because it signals a decline in potential enlisted supply. 37 Decreasing propensities to serve were initially counteracted by reduced recruiting objectives during the drawdown in force levels after Desert Shield/Desert Storm. With force levels predicated to remain stable in the near future, the decline in propensity to enlist remains a significant concern. In FY2000, Department of Defense met recruiting goals for the active force, but with much greater expenditures for recruits -about $10,000 per recruit compared with half that figure in the late 1980s.
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BEHAVIOR THEORIES
As it is measured in both the YATS and Monitoring the Future, propensity is extremely similar to the construct of intention, which has played a central role in many behavior theories.
Intention helps explain why some young adults are, and some are not, inclined to join the military. There are many theories of behavioral prediction, but three have most strongly influenced intention research:
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Social Cognitive Theory: According to social cognitive theory, two factors serve as primary determinants underlying the initiation and persistence of any behavior. First, the person must have self-efficacy with respect to the behavior. Second, he or she must have some incentive to perform the behavior. More specifically, the expected positive outcomes of performing the behavior must outweigh the expected negative outcomes. Social cognitive theory has focused on three types of expected outcomes: physical outcomes (e.g., performing the outcome will make me healthy); social outcomes (e.g., performing the behavior will make my parents proud); and self-standards (e.g., performing the behavior will make me proud).
Theory of Reasoned Action:
According to the theory of reasoned action, performance or nonperformance of a given behavior is primarily determined by the strength of one's intention to perform or not perform that behavior. The intention to perform a given behavior is, in turn, viewed as a function of two basic factors: one's attitude toward performing the behavior and one's subjective norm concerning the behavior, that is, the perception that one's important others think that one should or should not perform the behavior in question.
Health Belief Model:
According to this model, the likelihood that someone will adopt or continue to engage in a given behavior is primarily a function of two factors. First, the person must feel personally threatened by some perceived outcome, such as poor job prospects in the civilian labor market. Second, the person must believe that, in addition to preventing or alleviating this threat, the benefits of taking a particular action outweigh the perceived barriers to or costs of taking that action.
Behavioral theory can help to increase understanding of the factors influencing propensity and enlistment. Using behavioral theory models Bachman, Freedman-Doan, Segal, and O'Malley (2000) conducted a major study using eight demographic variables: race/ethnicity; number of parents in household; parents' average education; post/current residence (e.g., farm, city/large metropolitan region); religion; intentions to attend college; high school curriculum; and high school grades. 40 The two most important predictors for enlistment were race/ethnicity and college plans. Consistent with other studies, blacks were more likely than other ethnic groups to intend to join, while those with immediate college plans were least likely to indicate a propensity to join the military. 
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PRIMARY DETERMINANTS THAT CAUSE YOUNG ADULTS TO ENLIST
IMPORTANCE PLACED ON VARIOUS LIFE GOALS: COMPARISON OF RANK ORDER
The researchers admit that because of the limitation of the databases their conclusions are suggestive rather than definitive. YATS respondents were asked to indicate the importance of five randomly selected job attributes from a set of 26, such as "job security," "getting money for education," "preparation for future career or job," "doing something for country," "personal freedom," and "a job with good pay." 42 Additionally, the respondents were asked to indicate whether each of these five randomly selected attributes was more likely to be found "in the military," "a civilian job," or "equally in both." What they found was that beliefs were more important determinates of propensity than were values. 43 The more young adults felt that "doing something for my country" was important, the stronger their propensity to join the military.
Additionally, the more people felt that a "mental challenge" was important, the lower their propensity and the more they felt that "opportunity for adventure" was important, the higher their propensity to join the military.
44 Surprisingly, the study suggests that there is an apparent lack of relationship between propensity and attributes that have often been promoted by the militarymoney for education, pay, job security, and working in a high-tech environment.
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These findings clearly suggest that in order to increase propensity, the recruiting command should try to increase the importance of attributes such as "doing something for my country" and "having an opportunity for adventure." In addition, the Department of Defense should try to increase beliefs that individuals are more likely to obtain "patriotic adventure"
attributes in the military than in civilian life.
The National Research Council study suggests that consideration of patriotism, adventure, external incentives, opportunities for learning, and working conditions all influence young adults intentions to join the military. These findings strongly suggest that, in order to increase propensity to enlist, it will be useful to increase:
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(a) The value young adults place on "doing something for country" and on "opportunities for adventure,"
(b) Their beliefs that they are more likely to be doing something for the country and that they will have a greater opportunity for adventure in the military than in civilian life.
To illustrate this, Figure 2 shows how beliefs and values associated with "doing something for my country" relate to propensity. It indicates the percentage of young adults with positive propensity to join the military as a function of their beliefs that they are most likely to do something for the country in the military or in a civilian job (or equally or both). It also displays the degree to which they think that "doing something for the country" is important.
Consistent with the above analysis, we can infer that both importance and belief are highly related to propensity. The three bars on the left of Figure 2 indicate that those who believe that they are more likely to be doing something for the country in the military are almost 10 times more likely to have a positive propensity to join the military (23.8 percent) than those who believe that they are more likely to do something for the country in a civilian job (2.4 percent).
Equally important, those who think that doing something for the country is "extremely" important are more than three times likely to have a positive propensity (27 percent) than are those who think that "duty to country" is not at all important" (8.4 percent).
FIGURE 2. DO SOMETHING FOR COUNTRY
47 Figure 3 depicts the result of the data as it relates to "good pay." This data shows a different picture than that shown for "doing something for country." Those who believe that they are likely to get good pay in the military are six times as likely to have a positive propensity (31.4 percent) as those who believe they are most likely to get good pay in a civilian job (5.2 percent).
Those who think that "good pay" is "extremely important" are only slightly more likely to have a positive propensity (14.1 percent) than those who think that "good pay" is "not at all" important (10 percent).
FIGURE 3. GOOD PAY
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A final data indicator from the YATS study is worth mentioning. According to behavior theory social influencers, parents play a particularly important role in young adults' decisions to join the military. Figure 4 shows that the more young adults believe that they are likely to gain parental approval in the military (rather than in a civilian job), the more likely they are to have a propensity to join. Specifically, 40 percent of those who believe that they are more likely to gain parental approval by being in the military intend to join, while only 5.7 percent of those who believe they will gain more approval in a civilian job have a propensity to join. Incredibly, the value these young adults place on parental approval plays little or no role in influencing their propensity to enlist.
The National Research Council's study Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth suggests that the Army strategy for recruiting over the past decade was designed to pursue those with a strong propensity for service and try to close the deal: Fish were the fish are. Although this strategy has been moderately successful over the last decade, this has come at a significant increase in resources. The study suggests that the fishing hole, or those young adults with a high propensity to enlist, needs to be restocked and enlarged. In other words, the military must develop a strategy to increase the factors influencing propensity and enlistment.
FIGURE 4. GET PARENTS' APPROVAL
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Factors that influence recruiting programs include quality accession standards, military opportunities, allocation of resources, recruiting quotas, incentive programs, and tour lengths.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic factors such as military compensation, in-kind benefits, and the military environment all have an important effect on prospective recruits. Economic principles suggest that when the economy is strong, with low unemployment, recruiting becomes more difficult.
More recruiting resources are required to achieve a given recruiting goal. Similarly, during economic downturns, recruiting becomes somewhat easier. Fewer resources are required to achieve a given recruiting goal. 50 But predicting behavior based on economics alone does not provide the entire picture. If it did, the simple unconstrained solution would be to increase resource expenditures to solve recruiting ills. As the National Research Council concluded in their 2002 study, recruiting difficulty was in part due to a booming economy and in part due to the failure of recruiting resources to keep pace with recruiting mission. However, neither of these factors can explain a portion of the downturn. The downturn might be due to a change in attitude toward military service or other unmeasured factor. This unexplained portion causes military recruiters the most consternation and uncertainty.
The youth of today face a variety of choices, primarily among: (1) entering the civilian job market, (2) continuing education by entering college, and (3) entering military service.
Currently, the greatest challenge facing military recruiting is attracting college-bound youth. The military compete directly for the same youth market that colleges attempt to attract -high school graduates that score in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
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Recruiting efforts prior to 1999 focused on high school seniors, but since then the Army has refocused its main effort on the 565,000 two-and four-year college stop outs. 52 As the military seeks further to target this market, several key policy issues become paramount. As Charles
Moskos observes in, "What Ails the All-Volunteer Force," "the biggest disincentive for college youths is the long enlistment." 53 He advocates a 15-month or 18-month enlistment option, with a focus on humanitarian or peacekeeping missions. Moskos conducted his own survey among his 430 students in his introductory sociology class at Northwestern University and concluded that propensity to enlist doubled for the two-year option and tripled for the 15-month option. The
Army's transition into the college market has played an important role in achieving FY2000
volumetric and quality recruitment mission.
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CIVIL-MILITARY GAP
Although it is hard to measure conclusively, there is a strong perception that a gap exists between members of the military and the civil society it serves. Demographics among current enlisted and officer forces show a trend towards conservatism not shared by the rest of society.
While this revelation may not be surprising, it does support the perception that a gap exists.
Fewer and fewer National leaders in Congress, business, the media, and other professions have prior military service. As Senator John McCain, a member of the Armed Services Committee, has pointed out, "Most Americans don't care that much about national security and defense issues anymore." 55 As the global war on terrorism continues and the likelihood of war with Iraq grows, American's concern with security and defense rises. But it is uncertain how long the appetite will continue. Even so, the premise that elected officials will take a greater interest in those issues their constituents believe are important is an absolute. As Matthew Morgan points out in, "Army Recruiting and the Civil-Military Gap," American society seems to view the peacetime military as irrelevant to the major issues of popular life. So they pay little attention to military affairs and are less familiar and comfortable with the military, which might become a self-perpetuating trend.
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Closing the Civil-Military gap would assist our armed forces in meeting recruiting challenges. The more American society understands and accepts the roles and missions of their Armed Forces, the more likely they would consider military service an acceptable career path. Charles Moskos articulates the problem precisely when he advocates that casualty acceptance is at the root of our recruiting challenges:
He argues that casualty acceptance is not found in the cause itself, but in who is willing to die for that cause. Only when the privileged classes perform military service does the country define the cause as worth young people's blood. The advent of the all-volunteer force ensured that the children of our national elites would not be found in the military, especially in the enlisted ranks. This social reality, more than any other factor, has lowered our country's willingness to accept casualties. Citizens accept hardships only when their leadership is viewed as self-sacrificing. If we want ourselves to accept combat casualties, there are only two ways. Bring back a draft that starts conscriptions at the top of the social ladder. Or establish recruiting appeals that will garner some share of privileged youth.
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Moskos advocates that U.S. recruiting goals and the policies in place to support those goals must appeal to the higher echelons of America's social-economic-educational classes.
Most research to date has focused only on the beliefs concerning the benefits, (or positive attributes) of joining the military. 58 There is, however, one very important potential negative consequence of joining the military: one could be injured or killed. We have no data on the implications of this negative belief. If future evidence shows that fear of injury or death is a critical determinant of propensity, then different strategies and messages should address this finding.
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FACTORS LINKED TO RECRUITING SUCCESS
Two categories of factors are linked to recruiting success: The first class involves "doing more," meaning investing more resources in traditional recruiting activities. The second class involves "doing differently," meaning engaging in innovative recruiting activities or modifying the ways traditional activities are carried out.
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DOING MORE
Research indicates that recruiting success is responsive to additional expenditures in the number of recruiters, dollars spent on advertising, size of enlistment bonus, dollars spent on funding subsequent education and pay. 61 You get what you pay for. But finding the right mix of these expenditures is critical in today's constrained budgetary environment. We cannot afford to expend scarce resources --whether labor, money, or organizational energy --on activities that do not demonstrably contribute to the mission. There is a "can-do" culture in the military that says if you work harder and smarter, you can accomplish the mission. But the "can-do" culture can only take an organization so far. When the Army failed to fulfill its recruiting mission in the late 1990s, it suffered the effects of not providing adequate resources to accomplish the mission. Current research has indicated that military recruiters are utilizing the resources at their disposal in an efficient and effective manner. Recruiting is hard work, and it promises to get even harder in the future. Committing more resources where it makes sense and where it is efficient and effective will lighten the load on those doing the heavy work and will be necessary to maintain the all-volunteer force into the 21 st century.
DOING DIFFERENTLY
The Army should serious consider two different recruiting tactics:
EDUCATIONAL ENTICEMENTS
The Army has recently targeted as potential recruits those 17-25 year olds who are in college or who have started and left college for one reason or another. Targeting this group is a move in the right direction, but there is also a need to update our policies to make service to country more attractive to this group. Short-term enlistments and simultaneous enrollment in college programs should be part of the long-term solution. Tactical commanders will probably resist implementing simultaneous enrollment programs that take soldiers away from the unit's daily missions. Commanders are already over-tasked and under-resourced; they face high operations and personnel tempo rates. To make a simultaneous enrollment program successful, higher headquarters must grant relief from other requirements. Commanders must broaden their perspectives and view their soldiers' time in the college classroom as value added time beneficial to the army.
PRIMARY ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN
In the area of advertising, Department of Defense leadership should embark on an aggressive primary advertising campaign geared at the intrinsic values of service to country. A primary demand campaign focuses on information that promotes general interest in military service whereas selective demand focuses on unique or differentiating characteristics of each service. The targeted audience for this campaign should be the population with a negative propensity towards military service. It is important to target this population because studies have shown that approximately 46 percent of those who enlist came from the two negative intention groups. 62 With the exception of advertising by the Marine Corps, most advertising has focused on extrinsic incentives, paying little attention to intrinsic incentives. 63 The Army is proud to claim itself a value-based institution, yet their advertising messages enticing individuals to join emphasizes extrinsic factors instead. The Department of Defense and our elected officials, with support from individual services, should spearhead this primary advertising campaign.
"Ultimately, it is the responsibility of national leadership to determine the military's mission and to articulate that mission and the value of military service in ways that make it attractive to the public----including mothers, fathers, and prospective recruits."
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Recruiting is a complex and difficult business, at the heart core of the Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people to fight and win our Nation's battles. There is no single path to recruiting success, nor do we have unlimited resources to waste hastily in pursuit of these important goals. To meet its recruiting challenges, the Army must pursue both a course of "doing more" and a course of "doing differently." The path ahead will be difficult and full of obstacles. For the recruiters knocking on the door of American's sons and daughters seeking their service, the challenge is great. They need all the support and backing the nation can muster.
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